however, when irreparable injury is threatened. *Santee River, etc., Co.* v. *James*, 50 Fed. 360. Once the right at law is proved, irreparable injury is not essential to entitle a plaintiff to permanent relief. *D., L. & W. R. R. Co.* v. *Breckenridge*, 57 N. J. Eq. 154. Further, even without proof of irreparable injury, relief has been given when the plaintiff showed merely a strong *prima facie* title. *McArthur* v. *Matthewson*, 67 Ga. 134. But the wisdom of making the injunction perpetual when the title is honestly contested and falls short of being absolutely proved is doubtful. In effect the court has held that, since the defendant probably has no title, it is proper to treat him as having none whatsoever — a limitation on his legal rights not warranted by the merits or by any overbalancing requirement of expediency. To grant a perpetual injunction, however, is not unsupported where there has been long possession. See *Sanderlin* v. *Baxter*, 76 Va. 299.

JUDGMENTS — FOREIGN JUDGMENTS — EQUITABLE DECREE AS A CAUSE OF ACTION IN ANOTHER STATE. — In an action to quiet title the plaintiff relied on a foreign decree, rendered in divorce proceedings, which ordered the defendant to convey the land to the plaintiff. The plaintiff contends that the decree is conclusive of the rights of the parties, and that a deed to the second defendant, who had notice of the decree, was fraudulent and conveyed no title. *Held*, that the plaintiff has neither legal nor equitable title to the land, since the foreign court had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter. *Fall* v. *Fall*, 113 N. W. 175 (Neb.). See NOTES, p. 210.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — FRANCHISES AND LICENSES — PERMIT TO PRIVATE PERSONS TO OPERATE A SPUR TRACK. — The defendants, proprietors of a department store, obtained from the Board of Estimate and Apportionment of the city of New York a permit to construct a spur track from the adjoining street railway into their basement, and to run express cars over it during the night for the conveyance of goods. The plaintiff, an adjoining property owner, sought an injunction restraining the taking of any steps under such permit. *Held*, that the Board has no power to grant such a permit, and that the plaintiff is entitled to an injunction. *Hatfield* v. *Straus*, 189 N. Y. 208.

The courts are very strict in forbidding rights in city streets for any but public uses. *Gustafson* v. *Hamm*, 56 Minn. 334. The operation of a short spur track differs only in degree from the operation of a street railway of some length, and such railways, unless operated for public service, have been almost universally condemned by the courts as public nuisances. *Fanning* v. *Osborne*, 102 N. Y. 441; *contra*, *Truesdale* v. *Grape Sugar Co.*, 101 Ill. 561. And it would seem that the general interests of the city would not be sufficiently furthered to justify such permits on the ground of public policy. See *People* v. *B. & O. R. R. Co.*, 117 N. Y. 150. If the permit should be granted to the street railway company, it might be said that the right was secured solely for the benefit of the shipper and was an evasion to secure a private right. *Commonwealth* v. *City of Frankfort*, 92 Ky. 149. On the other hand, it has been argued that such a track was a necessary incident to the carriage of freight, and that not until another shipper was refused a similar connection with the main track could it be said that such a track was a private privilege. *P. C., etc., Ry. Co.* v. *City of Cincinnati*, 16 W'kly L. Bul. (Oh.) 367.

PARTNERSHIP — NATURE OF PARTNERSHIP — SITUS OF DECEASED PARTNER'S INTEREST. — Two partners residing in England carried on the business of sheep farming in New South Wales. On the death of one partner his share in the business was assessed for probate duty in New South Wales as an asset situated there. *Held*, that the assessment is valid. *Commissioner of Stamp Duties* v. *Salting*, [1907] A. C. 449.

On the death of a partner his representatives have merely a right of action for his interest in any surplus that may remain after an accounting and an adjustment of the partnership affairs. By the common law view this right of action is against the surviving partner, who has the title to all the firm assets. *Case* v. *Abeel*, 1 Paige (N. Y.) 393; see 14 HARV. L. REV. 145. By this view

the decision is wrong, for the English theory is that a chose in action is situated at the debtor's residence for purposes of probate duty; so the right against the surviving partner in England is an English asset. *In re Smyth*, [1898] 1 Ch. 89. But by the mercantile view the partnership assets are owned by the firm as an entity. *Hopkins* v. *Baker Bros. & Co.*, 78 Md. 363; *Pratt* v. *McGuinness*, 173 Mass. 170. The right of action is against this entity which is a New South Wales firm, as its business is in that country. *Laidlay* v. *Lord Advocate*, 15 App. Cas. 468. Hence the decision that the right is a New South Wales asset is in line with the modern authorities which, while not openly and courageously adopting the mercantile theory, reach results that can be justified on no other basis. See 57 Cent. L. J. 343; 17 HARV. L. REV. 207.

PARTY WALLS — COMPENSATION FOR USE IN THE ABSENCE OF AGREEMENT. — On enlarging his store, an owner of land built the exterior wall half on his own and half on the adjoining lot, without permission or agreement to divide the expense. Both lots were sold, and the vendee of the adjoining owner in building made use of that part of the wall which was on his land. *Held*, that the vendee of the builder of the wall can recover the value of the use made of the wall. *Spaulding* v. *Grundy*, 104 S. W. 293 (Ky.).

On facts similar to these, the builder of the wall has uniformly been denied the right to proportionate contribution to the cost of erection from the adjoining owner or his grantee, who makes use of the wall. *Preiss* v. *Parker*, 67 Ala. 500; *List* v. *Hornbrook*, 2 W. Va. 340. Recovery limited to the value of the use actually made has been sanctioned in only one case. See *Sanders* v. *Martin*, 2 Lea (Tenn.) 213; *contra*, *Sherred* v. *Cisco*, 4 Sandf. (N. Y.) 480. Whether the recovery be measured by the builder's outlay or by the value of the use of that which the adjoining owner never authorized to be put on his land, the latter is arbitrarily forced to pay for using part of his own land, in the alternative of suffering a diminution in its size or of adopting his remedy of self-help, which would cause needlessly great injury. *Wigford* v. *Gill*, Cro. Eliz. 269; see *Sherred* v. *Cisco*, *supra*, 489. Moreover, the builder of the wall is amply protected by estoppel, if it appear that he was reasonable in assuming a promise by the adjoining owner to pay if he used the wall. *Day* v. *Caton*, 119 Mass. 513. In the case discussed there appears to be no basis for such an assumption; consequently the result seems unwarranted.

POWERS—DEFECTIVE APPOINTMENT—WHEN EQUITY WILL REAPPOINT. — The testatrix bequeathed property to her husband to appoint "$4,000 to my mother's family and the balance to my father's family in such manner as he thinks proper." The donee of the power appointed $4,500 to the mother's family. *Held*, that the appointment is void and that the court cannot appoint the property. *In re Roger's Estate*, 67 Atl. 762 (Pa.).

Where the donee of the power is not required to exercise it, equity will make no appointment. See *Brown* v. *Higgs*, 8 Ves. Jr. 561. But in the present case it seems clear that no discretion was given. The court, while recognizing that the property is held in trust, calls it a trust for the donor. This seems erroneous, as the trust should be for the beneficiaries. See *Brown* v. *Higgs*, *supra*. Where the power is to be exercised for a definite class with no power of exclusion, and members of that class are excluded, equity distributes equally to the entire class. *Kemp* v. *Kemp*, 5 Ves. Jr. 849. Moreover, it is held that where the power is to be exercised for "relations" with power of exclusion, all the "relations" are *cestuis*, and, on a failure to exercise the power, the next of kin will take. *Harding* v. *Glyn*, 1 Atk. 469. Where there has been an attempt to appoint too much, as in the present case, it has been held that the last appointees lose their share. *Trollope* v. *Routlege*, 1 De G. & Sm. 662. This last decision was based on the intention of the donee. In the present case, however, since no preference seems intended, a *pro rata* distribution among the appointees seems desirable on the analogy of the abatement of legacies.

SALES — SALE OF GOODS ACT — EFFECT OF TENDER OF PAYMENT ON VERBAL AGREEMENT. — The plaintiff orally agreed to purchase goods exceed-